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Atomic Weapons Program, Soviet
The Soviet atomic weapons program began during World War II through
domestic scientific research and development efforts lead by nuclear physicists
Igor Kurchatov (1903-1960) and Andrei Sakharov (1921-1989) and assisted by
captured German scientists. These programs also involved foreign espionage by
individuals such as Klaus Fuchs (1911-1988) and Ethel (1915-1953)and Julius
Rosenburg (1918-1953) targeting the United Kingdom and United States.
Enhancing their nuclear arsenal through espionage against the U.S. and NATO was
an ongoing Soviet goal during the Cold War era.
These efforts succeeded in producing the first Soviet atomic bomb exploded on
August 29, 1949 at Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan. The first Soviet hydrogen bomb
exploded on August 12, 1953, also at Semipalatinsk. Subsequent decades saw the
Soviets develop an extensive nuclear weapons research and testing program and
various locales including Krasnoyarsk, Sverdlovsk, and Tomsk.
This program featured a nuclear weapons triad covering air-, land-, and seabased legs whose sized continually increased and eventually surpassed the U.S.
nuclear deterrent. This arsenal consisted of intermediate range nuclear missiles
such as the SS-20 which threatened Western Europe; the SS-18 ICBM. whose
11,000 kilometer range made it capable of reaching the United States;, the

Typhoon class SLBM SS-N-5 missile with a 1,650 kilometer range; and the Backfire
and Blackjack nuclear bombers. Moscow’s arsenal eventually reached a size of
8,043 warheads in 1981, with some of these being capable of delivering multiple
strikes to divergent targets from a single missile.
For several decades the Soviet nuclear weapons program was a major factor in
international politics and security. Its potential use in the 1962 Cuban Missile
Crisis and the specter of its use in other Cold War confrontations limited the
flexibility of the United States and allied countries to militarily pressure the
Soviets for fear of Moscow’s military retaliation.
The Soviet nuclear weapons buildup continued despite rhetoric from Soviet
leaders about the dangers of a nuclear arms race; their advocacy of arms control
agreements with the United States such as Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty I
(1972) and ABM Treaty (1972), which they never intended to keep, and
repeatedly broke; and active and unsuccessful propaganda and intelligence
efforts to keep the United States and its NATO allies from deploying Pershing II
intermediate range nuclear missiles in Western Europe in 1983.
An extensive nuclear doctrine was also developed by the Soviet military
governing the use of these weapons. Characteristics of this doctrine included
preemption or first strike capability, quantitative superiority since a nuclear war

could be of extended duration, counterforce targeting, combined arms operations
supplementing nuclear strikes, and defense against nuclear weapons attacks.
During the 1980s under Mikhail Gorbachev the Soviets expressed increasing
concern against U.S. efforts to develop ballistic missile defenses through the
Reagan Administration’s Strategic Defense Initiative (“Star Wars”). Both sides
held off on deploying ballistic missile defenses, but research into these systems
continued and the U.S. would eventually withdraw from the ABM Treaty in 2001.
The Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991 resulted in the dispersal of its nuclear
arsenal to successor states such as the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, and
Ukraine-- although these weapons would eventually be consolidated into the
Russian Federation. The early years of the Russian Federation saw hard economic
times which negatively impacted the Soviet nuclear weapons workforce. Many
scientists lost their jobs due to government spending reductions and moved to
the licit and illicit international nuclear markets to offer their expertise to
prospective employers. There was also international concern over securing the
Soviet nuclear weapons arsenal which the U.S. addressed by establishing the
Nunn-Lugar program in November 1991 providing funding and technical expertise
to safeguard and dismantle Russia’s large stockpiles of weapons of mass
destruction and delivery systems.

The Soviet atomic weapons program left a legacy of environmental damage in
many areas of the former Soviet Union. The Russian Federation retains significant
stockpiles of nuclear weapons and using nuclear weapons remains a significant
part of Russian military doctrine two decades after the Soviet Union’s collapse.
Russia’s withdrawal from Nunn-Lugar in October 2012 raises additional questions
about Russia’s commitment to nuclear nonproliferation.
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